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Abstract. Tax and public service competition between local governments concerning localisation of 
new residents is analysed in a setting of economic spillovers which means that also a neighbouring 
region will benefit from localisation via demand of residents in a border region, (a so-called host 
region). We identify two basic Nash-equilibrium outcomes of the analysed tax-game. In one of 
these outcomes local tax rates will be different across the regions – a fact that appears important for 
(future) empirical studies of local tax competition. Due to the lack of adequate theoretical 
modelling, studies in this field have often demonstrated spatial dependence of local policy variables 
without identifying the source of interaction between decision-makers. Our theoretical findings 
prove to be robust to a range of important expansions of the basic simple framework.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Over the past several years, theoretical and empirical studies have investigated various perspectives 
of tax and public service competition in a system of political jurisdictions. A range of important 
issues are considered in a variety of international policy fields, such as investment policy, trade 
policy, migration policy and environmental policy.
1  
 
The focus in the present paper relates to household locational choices and tax competition between 
local governments. We provide an analysis of the strategic interaction between two local 
governments concerning a local policy variable that is assumed essential for the choice of 
jurisdiction of new residents planning to locate in the community defined as the regions covered by 
both jurisdictions. As for domestic household locational choices, a strategic setting is preferable 
even for small jurisdictions since households are likely to consider relatively few neighbouring 
regions as close substitutes.  Households may thus typically possess relatively strong preferences 
about living in the local area nearby their workplace, their relatives, etc., whereas preferences are 
weaker concerning more specific locations in the local area. In situations where a household for 
some reason has decided to move and settle down in a geographic area, the specific choice of 
location between regions in the area may then to a large extent be dictated by tax and public service 
levels set by the local governments. 
 
Our motivation for the following analysis is to clarify this kind of strategic interaction in the 
presence of economic spillover effects between regions meaning, for example, that benefits in a 
region depend on the demand of residents in surrounding regions. Although spillover models 
constitutes a major research line in the tax competition literature, only a few theoretic analyses are 
based on a setting of local governments.
2 Considering the growing number of empirical studies on 
                                                 
1 Analytically, an important distinction between models is whether strategic interactions are present or not. In the tax-
competition literature, where the focus is on taxation of a mobile capital base, early models such as Wilson (1986) and 
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) provide analyses in fully competitive settings: A tax on a locally employed capital 
base finances a local public good, jurisdictions are small, and are not in a position to affect after-tax-returns to capital. 
Mintz and Tulkens (1986) and Bucovetsky (1991) were among the first to introduce strategic behavior between units. 
Both forms of models basically conclude that public goods typically are underprovided since jurisdictions lower tax 
rates due to competition as they try to keep the local tax base intact. See Wilson (1999) for a survey of the early 
literature.  
 
2 In these studies strategic interactions are, unlike the interactions in the present study, assumed to stem form voters’ 
views on the performance of local politicians which leads to so-called yardstick competition.    3
spatial correlation and tax competition effects on tax rates at local level there is a need for a better 
theoretical description and understanding of various sources of interactions at local level. This need 
is for instance reflected via the empirical specification of strategic interaction in a number of studies 
where spatial reaction functions appear to be similar for both tax competition and yardstick 
competition.
3 Spillover effects are pervasive in some settings of tax competitions. As an example, 
environmental regulation constitutes an obvious case across national borders due to externalities of 
global pollution. In other settings spillover effects may be more pronounced among local regions 
than among national regions, and there is reason to believe this is the situation for the kind of 
effects considered in the present analysis, where spillover effects arise in the simplest form of the 
model via profits from local consumption accruing to economic agents in both regions. As we 
develop the basic model, spillovers will further include positive benefits of employment on the 
regions, as higher levels of employment in one jurisdiction are likely to lead to improved growth 
opportunities also for neighbouring regions within national borders.  
 
In relation to residential location, a key feature of the model to be presented is the ‘locational 
surplus’, which a region achieves by being a host region for new residents rather than being a 
neighbouring region for these. As potential new residents in the two regions would want to settle 
down in the region with the lowest level of the policy variable, competition in this variable may 
lead to discontinuous jumps in benefits of a region because a change in the policy variable may 
change the status for a region in the form of a host or neighbouring region. This basically leads to 
two forms of Nash equilibria in the policy variables where in the first form the policy variables are 
equal and benefit levels are the same for the host and neighbouring region. In the other form of 
Nash-equilibrium the policy variables are different in the two regions and benefits are highest in the 
neighbouring region, which can be interpreted as a situation where the variable of the neighbouring 
region is set at a sufficiently high level to keep the other region in its role as a host. Given our 
formulation of strategic interaction between local governments, it is moreover noteworthy that we 
do not arrive at the conclusion that equilibrium policy variables will necessarily be set too low 
relative to the Pareto efficient level for the joint benefit of the two regions. This is, as mentioned, in 
contrast to most of the literature on tax and public service competition. The model presented in the 
                                                 
3 See for example Edmark and Ågren (2008) for a discussion on this. The study is one of only a few empirical 
examinations attempting to uncover the underlying source of spatial correlation in taxes by making use of a reform of 
the central government system of grants in Sweden. See also Besley and Case (1995) and Bordignon et al. (2003). In a 
survey of empirical studies, Brueckner (2003) also points to the same ultimate empirical specifications in tests of 
different effects of strategic interaction.   4
following draws on Hoel (1997) where the related issue of a game in environmental taxes between 
the governments of two countries is analysed in relation to location decisions of producers 
regarding polluting production plants. We apply and gradually extend Hoel’s model to also account 
for real-world issues ignored in the basic analysis. For example, one can rarely identify a strict host 
region and a strict neighbouring region in practice, as jurisdictions are always to some extent hosts 
for all kinds of demographic groups, although some of these groups may be represented in a limited 
number. We hence consider how decision-making on multiple potential new households, rather than 
just one household, will change the Nash equilibria and outcomes of the basic tax game.  
 
The fact that strategic policy variables may end up being different across regions in a Nash 
equilibrium is an important theoretical input for empirical studies of spatial correlations in tax and 
public service variables. Examinations of taxation decisions of competing jurisdictions are often 
constructed to search for evidence of tax mimicing, for instance by identifying a statistically 
significant positive correlation between a given local tax rate and tax rates in neighbouring 
jurisdictions. Authors are likely to consider cases where no such relations have been found as 
evidence of no strategic interaction in tax rates. In the light of the analysis in the present paper, no 
conclusion can be drawn on strategic interactions even in the absence of tax mimicing, insofar as 
interactions between local policy makers may result in a Nash equilibrium with different levels of 
strategic policy variables.  
 
Before presenting the theoretical framework, in the next section we offer a first empirical insight 
into the issue of spatial interaction between locals, based on Danish data. Section 3 presents the 
model and outlines the two basic outcomes of the Nash equilibrium for the game. In section 4 the 
model is expanded in a variety of directions in order to examine the robustness of results in more 
realistic settings, and we finally prove that the basic findings on equilibrium outcomes of the model 
will carry over to more general frameworks. In particular, under relatively general formulations of 
the host and neighbour benefit functions there will be one, and only one, pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium of the tax game. Finally, section 5 concludes.    5
2.  Related empirical estimations for the case of Denmark 
 
We will briefly consider empirical data for Danish municipalities to provide some evidence of 
spatial dependence between potential local strategic variables. In Denmark, as well as other 
Scandinavian countries, the public sector is organised into three governmental levels, respectively 
the municipal level, the county level and the central state level. Given a relatively high level of 
decentralisation at the local level, with 275 municipalities having individual responsibility of a 
range of service variables interesting for our study, Denmark lends itself to empirical examinations 
of spatial correlations between local policy variables. The responsibilities of Danish municipalities 
both concern the provision and the financing of service variables, and, as to the present theoretical 
analysis, the strategic policy variable also gains interpretation in terms of service variables applied 
in attracting or deterring certain demographic groups. Some of these variables naturally appear to be 
more obvious than others as a strategic instrument. For example, a local region, with ambitions of 
raising the number of young families in its jurisdiction (due to an overall objective of increasing 
local labour supply), may choose child day care prices as a strategic variable rather than income tax 
rates. Below, we focus on both local income taxes and day care prices to estimate their mutual 




Data for the study were obtained from the Key Data Base maintained by the Danish Ministry of the 
Interior and consist of observations from 268 of the 275 Danish municipalities (7 small 
municipalities located on islands were excluded due to lack of data), obtained annually from 2000 
through 2006. In 2007, a municipality reform changed the number of municipalities from 275 to 98, 
so that data from later years were inapplicable for the analysis. Table 1 provides an overview of the 
data for the study.   6
 
Table 1. Data for the study.  
 
 
Variable Definition  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Municipal tax rate  Municipal tax percentage  21.02  1.30 
Municipal tax base  Municipal tax base per resident  (1,000 DKK)  124.56  24.36 
Municipal child care 
expenditure 
Total child care expenditures per child, 0-10 
years of age (1,000 DKK) 
40.06 74.90 
User fee  Monthly child care user fee per child, 0-2 
years of age (1,000 DKK) 
2.03 2.55 
Note: 1) Observations for 268 municipalities, yearly 2000-2006; price adjusted (2000=100). 2) One DKK is 
approximately 0,13 €.  
 
 
Three measures of municipal variables are included: The municipal income tax rate, the expenditure 
per child for the service variable child day care of 0-10 years of age, and the user fee for child day 
care of 0-2 years of age. Furthermore, to control for the economic ability of the municipality, and as 
a rough measure of the household income in the theoretical analysis, the per resident municipal tax 
base is included as a control variable. 
 
Regression methods and results 
 
To investigate spatial interactions across neighbourhood municipalities, we apply a spatial 
autoregressive specification from spatial econometrics. Initially, given N = 268 municipalities, an N 
 N matrix W is set up such that wij equals 1/ki, only if the municipalities i and j are neighbours, 
where ki is the number of neighbouring municipalities of municipality i. In case i and j are not 
neighbours, then wij is set to 0.
4 With yt being a service measure (tax rate, child care expenditure or 
user fee) of the 268 municipalities for a given year t, the product Wyt hence defines a variable, 
which for each municipality holds the average of the tax rate for the neighbourhood municipalities. 
The SAR specification (Anselin, 1988) reads as: 
     t t t t X Wy y       ) (,      ( 1 )  
                                                 
4 In line with other studies, we define two municipalities as neighbours only if they share borders. Implicitly, we thus 
assume that local decision-makers exclusively consider border municipalities as competitors.   7
where  is a parameter specifying the degree of spatial spillover, formally restricted to the interval 
between -1 and 1, but for most practical purposes is simply restricted to be non-negative, and Xt 
contains exogenous variables (i.e. the municipal tax base and a constant term). A significantly 
positive spillover parameter will now be indicative of municipal service competition. 
Furthermore, given that data are available for several years, it is possible (and indeed statistically 
efficient) to account for intra-municipal behavioural correlation across years, using a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) type specification to the residual of (1); see Anselin (1988). Between 
any two years, the residual covariance reads as 
    
'2 () , ts t s EI      , 2000,..,2006 ts ,     (2) 
so that a joint SAR-SUR specification occurs. Given that the dependent variable occurs on the right 
hand side of (2), traditional OLS or GLS approaches will lead to biased estimates of the parameters. 
Rather, a Maximum Likelihood (ML) approach is applied (Anselin, 1988). 
 
Table 2. Regression models for tax percentage. 
 
 Model  (Y) 
  Tax rate  Expenditure 0-10 User fee 0-2 
Constant  15.10 (0.16)*  9.98 (0.74)*  0.56 (0.03)* 
Spatial spillover  0.27 (0.005)*  0.53 (0.007)*  0.51 (0.004)* 
Tax base  0.0007 (0.0005)  0.08 (0.005)*  0.003 (0.001)* 
Log Likelihood  -1813.23  -14970.56  -9775.01 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Significance indicated by * (1%) 
 
 
The estimation results are collected in Table 2. The spatial spillover is significant for all three 
service measures. The interaction seems to be most profound for child day care, as indicated by the 
relatively high coefficients of 0.53 for expenditure and 0.51 for the user fee. For the tax rate, the 
coefficient is of a relatively smaller magnitude of 0.27. The economic abilities of the municipality, 
as measured by the tax base, seem to impact daycare service, while they have no significant impact 
on the tax rate.
5 We now turn to the theoretical analysis. 
 
                                                 
5  For another Scandinavian country, namely Sweden, Edmark and Ågren (2008), using an instrument variable 
approach, estimate the spatial coefficient of neighbouring tax rates to have a positive and significant effect on the own 
tax rate for municipalities. This study also finds a markedly higher coefficient of 0.74. See Allers and Elhorst (2005) for 
other  recent studies providing evidence of spatial interaction processes in local tax rates.   8
3.  The model 
 
We consider two regions for localisation, each representing a local jurisdiction. New residents
6 who  
locate within the regions face the respective local taxes and tariffs for public services and have the 
rights to enjoy public services supplied by the jurisdiction. A new resident in the area will locate in 
the region offering the highest flow of public services net of tax and tariff payments to this region 
from the resident. We assume that the total tax bill of a resident depends on the level of a policy 
variable σ set by local authorities. The following analysis does not necessitate further specification 
of the policy variable. The modelling practice in the tax competition literature is to focus on a 
capital tax as the local policy instrument  –  often interpreted as an important component of broader 
property taxes at local level. The present analysis is in line with these analyses as we essentially 
consider a situation with a single tax instrument levied on mobile factors. The set-up to be presented 
also allows interpretation of the choice variable in terms of a user fee, levied at the local level on 
those demanding public school or day care services, which may be applied in combination with 
public subsidies to finance such services. A higher level of σ may thus reflect a higher user fee or 
consumer price (equivalent to a lower public subsidy) for various publicly supported activities. The 
choice variable is referred to as a tax rate in the following. 
 
In the light of national equity objectives, we also assume political feasibility restrictions on local 
policy design towards funds and services: to comply with national constitutions local policymakers 
need to formulate income dependent policies towards citizens so that, for a given level of the policy 
variable, public revenues and services will, respectively, rise and fall in income levels. Given these 
restrictions, we disregard situations where a local policy-maker chooses to provide higher net flows 
of services the higher the household income, in order to make attractive high income groups locate 
in the region (where ‘attractive’ could be seen in terms of high local buying power or high-value 
local labor supply). 
 
Denote the public revenues from a new resident with income I by   , RI  and the cost to the region 
of the local service level towards this resident by   ,, SI   with  0, 0 I RR   , 0 I S   and  0. S   
Revenues,  , RI from the resident can be seen as the total tax bill to the resident at the local level 
                                                 
6 As the economic unit could also be seen as a household, we alternate between the terms ‘household’ and ’resident’ in 
what follows.   9
including income taxes, property taxes and public user fees, and these revenues will naturally 
depend on the income of the resident. The service costs,   , SI   are also assumed to be a function 
of I, as services offered to residents may in many cases depend on their level of income. We 
moreover assume local budget concerns by making service costs depend on σ in order to mirror a 




We shall first consider income levels of potential new residents to be exogenously given. Sub-
sequently, income is endogenised by making the supply of labour from the household depend on the 
level of σ, given that labor supply depends on after tax disposable income. Then consider 
      ,,, , NI RI SI     which is the extra ‘net public fund’ of a region following a residential 
choice of this region. In the case of exogenous income, the disposable income as defined here will 
be      ,,
d II IN I    , which expresses the income left for consumption after net payments to 
the local region (thus disregarding state tax payments and services). Marginal disposable income 
with respect to I is assumed positive, that is  10
d
II IN    (or equivalently  1 II RS  ), which 
seems reasonable, as in the opposite case any incentives of individuals to supply labour units will 
vanish. Further, disposable income will fall in σ, meaning 0
d IN     (or equivalently 
0 RS   ). As we also ignore degressive tax policies (inclusive of public service amounts), 
0 II II RS  . Assume further that the net public fund effects of a higher fund raising policy are 
declining in σ, that is 0 RI    . Finally, the choice variable is normalised so that σ = 0 
represents the most lenient tax policy of a jurisdiction. Assume that for any income there will 
always be a negative net public fund for this level, whereby   ,0 0, NI I    For both regions we 
will moreover assume a maximum level  of the policy variable. This level can be interpreted as an 
upper restriction on local public activity imposed on local jurisdictions by the national government 
having overall fiscal policy objectives for the country. 
 
                                                 
7 We do not incorporate an explicit budget constraint for the regions as the policy variable in focus is to be perceived as 
just one specific instrument for the locals among many others. We shall shortly introduce a cost of raising public funds 
which may reflect tax distortions from adjusting other tax instruments when the considered policy variable is changed.  
   10
As residents spend a major part of their disposable income locally, business in a region also benefits 
from localisation. Assume a commensurate good, representing goods from local retail, local culture, 
etc., being supplied in both regions. The price P of this good is assumed constant and unaffected by 
extra demand from localisation. This assumption is only for reasons of simplicity and it means that 
policy makers in their choice of the local tax level ignore local price change effects on local benefits 
which seems reasonable relative to practice. Moreover, marginal production costs for the good are 
constant and also the same for all producers, simply given by b. There are two spillover effects of 
trade on the neighbouring region from the region hosting new residents: a share of profits from sales 
in the host region belongs to owners living in the neighbouring region, and new residents moreover 
spend a part of their income in the neighbouring region. We shall assume the aggregate neighbour 
spillover effect to be the same for both regions. In other words, in the position of a neighbour, 
regions will enjoy the same benefit from the private spending of new residents located in the host 
region, for a given σ in this region. All owners of profits from the commensurate good are assumed 
to live within the two regions. This can be formalised as follows: denote by δ the part of owners 
who live in the region in which an amount q of their product is traded, with01    . The profit  
δ(p  – b)q would then accrue to these owners while owners in the other region would achieve the 
profit (1  – δ)(p – b)q. For each unit q of the good bought by new residents the shares γ and (1 –  γ) 
are, respectively, sold in the host and the neighbouring region. The total share of profits of the host 
region from new residents’ private consumption then becomes γδ + (1 – γ)(1 – δ) ≤ 1 where the last 
term represents the host region’s profits from trade in the neighbouring region. We henceforth 
denote this total share by θ with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 for0,1     . By analogous reasoning the profit shares 
of the neighbouring regions profit share becomes γ(1 – δ) + (1 –  γ)δ = 1 – θ. Demand for the 
commensurate good is given by the relation  
 
                                                           
d qA P I   ,                           (3) 
  
where 01    and 
d A PI   . A higher disposable income will increase the demand of the 
locally produced good meaning that local policy makers are able to impact on local business 
activity through their decision on the level of . 
 
Consider next the effects for the regions of the level of policy variable imposed on prospective new 
residents with income I in one of the regions. Policymakers consider the total benefits for the region   11
in terms of the value of changes in public funds and business profits. The benefits for the region in 
which a household with income I locates (the host region) is then  
 
          ()1 , , ,
hh h h d BN I P b q I               (4) 
 
where we have assumed that there is a cost to the region of raising public funds, denoted λ , such as 
tax distortion in other sectors. Then a net public fund N from a new household will be worth  
(1 + λ)N to the region. Recall that N may be negative, in which case the amount in (4) may be 
negative. Due to the neighbour spillover effects of private consumption there will be benefits also 
for the neighbouring  region
n B . Given a region is a neighbour, the spillover effect yields  
 
       ()1 , .
nh h d B Pb q I                    (5) 
As all spillovers are generated from the demand of the new resident located in the other region, 
neighbour benefits in the tax game are thus a function of only the choice variable in the host region. 
(We suppress the ‘h’ topnote henceforth). It will be useful in what follows to consider the difference 
in benefits between the host and the neighbouring region, given by the relation  
 
                                             () () 1 , 2 1 , .
hn d BB N I P b q I                    (6) 
 
We restrict our attention to cases where for the most lenient tax policy level, σ = 0, the benefit of the 
host region is lower than the spillover benefits of the neighbour so that  (0) (0) 0.
hn BB   From the 
expressions it follows by use of (3) that 
 
   () 1 [ 1 ( ) ]
h dB
NP b N P b N
d
       

                                        (7) 
and 






                                                                                    (8) 
 
The sign of (7) is ambiguous depending on parameter values, whereas (8) is negative for any σ. This 
opens up for various outcomes of strategic interaction as illustrated in Figure 1a-d where benefit   12
levels of the two regions are depicted as functions of the policy variable in the region chosen for 
localisation, that is  .
h   Throughout the analysis, we will apply the curves for relations (4) and (5) 
to identify equilibrium tax variables and outcomes for the tax game between the local governments. 
 
Suppose first, that [1 ( )] 0 Pb      so that the host region gains from a higher σ meaning that 
the marginal gain in net revenue of public funds always exceeds the local marginal loss in producer 
surplus. In this situation there will be a unique Nash equilibrium between decision-makers in the 
regions that leads to the same levels of the policy variable with  
** ,
hn    . As illustrated in 
Figure 1a, for  
** ,
hn    strictly less than  , benefits are equal for the host region and the 
neighbouring region in this equilibrium, entailing that expression (6) above equals zero. To see that 
this is the unique equilibrium, first note that different values of the policy variables in the regions 
always induce region h, (being the host and thereby having set the lowest policy variable), to raise σ 
to achieve a higher benefit. Second, no other equal levels of σ than *   where 
(* )
h B   (* )
n B  would constitute a Nash-equilibrium: for alternative identical levels lower than 
*  , the host region would have an incentive to raise its policy variable to take over the role of a 
neighbour region, and for identical levels higher than  *  , the neighbour region would in turn be 
better off by reducing its standard to become the host region. For   
** (,) , ,
hn h n     both regions 
would in contrast reduce their benefits by changing σ, taking the policy variable level, *  , for the 
rival player as given. (For these levels, note in particular that if the host country raises σ, it would 
become the neighbouring region and hence achieve a benefit change along the ( )
nh B  path and not 
along the ( )
hh B  path. Likewise, the present neighbouring region would become the host region if it 
lowers 
n  , and therefore it faces a reduction in benefit from this.) We could think of this 
equilibrium case as a situation where regions compete in being the neighbour region rather than the 
host region for policy variables lower than  *   whereas for levels beyond  *  , regions prefer being 
the host and then compete by  lowering the policy variable. Note that in spite of competition on 
attracting residents, the benefits for both regions are positive in equilibrium.  
 
Still for [1 ( )] 0 Pb     , a variant of the equilibrium depicted in Figure 1a occurs when the 
level of   for which ( ) ( )
hn BB    exceeds  , see figure 1b. This turns competition into the so-
called case of ‘Not In My Backyard’ in which regions compete to avoid being the host since the role   13
of a neighbouring region is the most attractive for any choice of legal policy variable. This ends up 
in an equilibrium where both regions adopt the toughest legal local policy within the federation, 
represented by the policy variable . In equilibrium the host region therefore cannot evade its host 
role by tightening local policy even further, given
h    . The neighbouring region’s best reply is 
obviously the toughest policy, as any reduction of 
n   below   would imply that it takes over as 
the host, which may lead to a discontinous (large) reduction in benefit. Hence, the strategy 
combination   
** (,) ,
hn      is the only equilibrium. As to the payoff for this game, note that 
   
hn BB    and the benefit to the host region  
h B  may be negative or positive, whereas 
0
n B   , given our assumptions.  
   
        Figure 1a. Equal taxes and equal benefits in equilibrium                    Figure 1b. The case of ‘Not in my backyard’  
 
Now consider the case where [1 ( )] 0 Pb     . Both benefit curves are decreasing in 
h   as 
shown in figure 1c, and depending on the levels and shape of   
h B  and   
n B  , these may or may 
not cut. Note here that for any  0
h    and for 
n   given, the host region always becomes better off 
by lowering 
h  , (as it remains a host), and therefore a Nash equilibrium may necessarily involve 
the host to set  0.
h    For  0
h   , any level of 
n   lower than     , where      is defined by 
     0
hn BB   , cannot be sustained as a Nash-equilibrium since if    n    , the host would then 
deviate from  0
h    and choose a policy variable higher than 




















h B  
B
n  14
become a neighbour and enjoy a benefit higher than     
n B  . All combinations of  0
h    and 
  n     are then a Nash equilibrium in this case. In any equilibrium the regions gain   0
h B  and 
  0
n B  whereby both parties are seen to achieve maximum benefits, given their respective 
individual roles as host and neighbour. This form of equilibrium will be generated whether the 
curves cross or not. In the case where    0
hn BB    there exists no     <   for which 
     0
hn BB   and the unique Nash equilibrium will be the strategy profile     ,0 , .
hn     The 
neighbour sets 
n   at its highest legal level which the host region is not allowed to exceed and, in 
consequence,  0
h   is the best response for the host. This is the situation depicted in figure 1d. 
 




By means of the above simple framework we have gained insight in basic competition between 
strategically dependent jurisdictions in recruiting new residents. Based on the income flow potential 
of localisation for the local community, regions will either compete in attracting or deterring 
localisation. 
 
Proposition 1. For  0
h dB d   an ‘Equal Tax Equal Benefit’ (ETEB) equilibrium outcome will 
emerge in which the host and neighbouring regions impose the same tax level and achieve the same 
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both regions impose the highest feasible tax level, whereas the host benefit is less than the 
neighbour benefit. For  0
h dB d   an ‘Unequal Tax Unequal Benefit’ (UTUB) equilibrium 
outcome will emerge in which tax levels as well as benefits are lowest in the host region. The tax in 




An interesting issue remains to be considered: will social benefits – interpreted as the sum of 
benefits in the two regions – be maximised in the identified equilibria? Within the framework of the 
outlined model the answer to this is relatively clear. It appears from figure 1a and 1b that this will 
normally not be the case when competition results in an ETEB equilibrium. Only by coincidence 
will these equilibria also maximise the joint benefits of the regions. There is, on the other hand no, 
economic arguments indicating that this will never be the case. In contrast, in a UTUB equilibrium 
social benefits will always be maximised as both regions, as mentioned, achieve maximum benefits 
in equilibrium. This result of maximum social benefits for the UTUB equilibrium, however, arises 
only because in our application both benefit functions are decreasing in 
h  . If benefits of the host 
region, for instance, were first increasing and then decreasing over the defined interval for
h  , the 
UTUB equilibrium would obviously not be socially efficient. In other words, the result is not robust 
to realistic changes in assumptions in the form of spill over effects between the regions. 
 
4.  Equilibrium analysis in expanded frameworks 
 
Asymmetric costs and benefits between regions 
 
Regions are so far identical concerning costs and benefits of the local policy. Even though this may 
be a reasonable assumption for some settings, an obvious theoretical extension would be to examine 
tax equilibria under asymmetric net-benefits for the regions. In practice, there may be a number of 
reasons for asymmetry to arise; one region could benefit more than the other from additional labour 
resources, economies of scale in public production may appear in activities such as childcare and 
                                                 
8 As in Proposition 1, we will henceforth consider the Not In My Backyard case as an ETEB equilibrium, as the 
incentives in equilibrium are equivalent to an ETEB equilibrium and are only restricted by external rules for the policy 
variable. This is, however, somewhat misleading since the two regions receive different benefits in equilibrium in the 
Not In My Backyard case.  
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schooling, and so forth. Examining the consequences of asymmetry is also obvious given that the 
impact from tax changes on the present residents in a region may differ substantially across regions. 
Due to obvious real policy non-discriminatory rules of citizens in the same jurisdiction several 
residents (rather than just new residents) in a region are affected by changes in policy variables even 
though we have considered the strategic variable in focus as a specific instrument for affecting 
locational decision-making. The asymmetric costs and benefits originating from this may be 
pronounced when regions differ as to various demographic factors of citizens such as age 
distribution and industry composition, as this is likely to entail high income variation between 
regions. To demonstrate the consequences of asymmetry, we introduce unequal host benefits while 
neighbour benefits remain to be equal for the regions. Assume that the benefits to a host region are 
generally higher in region 1 than in region 2, and denote these values by 1
h B and 2
h B , respectively. 
Assume further that in situations with equal taxes in the regions, a new resident will choose the 
region with the highest benefit (region 1). It is obvious, that in case of rising benefits in the host 
region, see figure 2a, Nash equilibrium tax rates must be similar in the regions. (Suppose they were 
different. The host region could then increase benefits by raising its tax to the level given in the 
neighbouring region, as  1
h B  increases in
h  .) This leads to equilibria corresponding to the two basic 
situations already considered above. In addition, equal values of host and neighbour taxes within the 
interval [
** *    ] now also constitute a Nash equilibrium. Consider for instance the values for 
.
hn          These values will be equilibrium values since the neighbour (region 2) now has no 
incentive to lower its policy variable to take over the host role, as this would lead to a fall in benefit 
because  2 () ()
hn BB     between 
** * . and     Social efficiency in equilibrium will still only be 
realised by coincidence. Note, though, that the assumption that households will locate in region 1 
under equal taxes implies that the choice of region is efficient in equilibrium.  
 
When conditions leading to a UTUB type of equilibrium are present, we can identify equilibria with 
each of the regions as hosts, respectively; see figure 2b. In both cases the tax rate of the host region 
will be set at 
* 0
h    while the neighbour sets its tax rate at a level that deters the host from 
becoming a neighbour. With region 1 as a host, the neighbour will thus choose    * n    , and with 
region 2 as host, we have    * .
n     Social welfare is maximised only in the equilibria in which  
region 1 becomes the host. 









Competition for more than one potential new resident  
 
Local tax policy in a region is of interest to many potentially new residents in practice. Dealing with 
only one prospective new resident may lead to unawareness of an important aspect of benefit 
functions relative to situations in practice where locals face ‘many’ new residents: in cases where 
regions set the same tax level, both regions will host some new residents, and we therefore need 
therefore to modify the understanding of a host and a neighbouring region. With equal tax levels the 
two regions would receive respective shares s and (1 – s) of the new residents across the regions 
with 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, and with benefits modified accordingly. Assume that a given region receives the 
share s of an absolute number of new residents who want to locate in one of the two regions. The 
benefit to this region per ‘resident candidate’ now becomes 
 
                                      ,( 1 ) ,
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as the particular region obtains s and (1 – s) of its benefits per resident in the position of being, 
respectively, a host and a neighbour. Similarly, the benefits in the other region hosting the share  
(1 – s) become 
 
              ,1 (1 ) .
hn h h n Bss Bs B Bs BB                                   (10) 
 
Comparing the last expressions on the right-hand side in (7) and (8), it is clear that, relative to the  
case with one resident, the difference in benefits between regions is reduced, as an amount of the 
difference under the case of one resident is now allocated to the region with the lowest benefit. 
Graphically, the distance between the curves in figure 1a–d is therefore reduced; see figure 3. It 
follows from this that exactly the same equlibrium tax levels will arise in a game with competition 
for several residents as in a game with competition for only one new resident since all incentives are 
intact for all levels of 
h  and
n  . Therefore, assume a situation with equal tax rates different from 

** ,
hn   , such as      in figure 3 (in which case both regions will host new residents unless s = 1). 
Both regions will always have incentives to change the tax in the same direction as in the one 
resident case (although the absolute benefit levels per resident may differ). This reasoning will be 
valid irrespective of the level of equal taxes and of whether benefits of the host region are 
increasing or falling in the policy variable. In figure 3 the case with several new residents is 
illustrated with cost structures like in figure 1a for the one-resident case. We leave out the figures 
for the other types of benefit structures considered above. We can conclude that the results from the 
analysis in section 2 all carry over to a setting with competition for several new residents. Like in 
the one-resident case, the equilibrium will only be socially efficient by coincidence.   19
 
 
                 Figure 3. Competition on several new residents 
 
It should be emphasised that this insight hinges upon linearity of total benefits rather than on 
concavity or convexity of this. Put differently, the benefits to a region of hosting say M new 
residents needs to be M times the one-resident benefit 
h B ; that is,
h MB and linearity also apply for 
the neighbouring region. In practice, a local administration may obviously face economies (or 




Proposition 2. With asymmetric costs and benefits between regions new equilibria may arise 
relative to the symmetric case. For  0
h dB d  , equilibrium tax rates are still equal for the host 
and the neighbour, and an interval of similar tax levels now constitutes equilibrium values. In these 
equilibria the two regions will have different benefits. For  0
h dB d   two UTUB equilibria exist. 
The basic results outlined in Proposition 1 carry over to a setting where regions compete on the 
benefits from not only one but more new residents. 
                                                 
9 We can draw on the analysis of Hoel (1997) to obtain insight into the consequences of non-linearity of total benefit. 
Hoel examines the case of non-linearity of total benefits concerning country competition on several polluting firms. 
Non-linearity arises due to a convex environmental damage function. Essentially, Hoel identifies more equilibria than in 
the one-firm case, and in all equilibria taxes are the same for both countries. As for the present analysis, the result 
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Endogenising income levels of households 
 
There are several reasons to examine whether our main results on the two basic types of equilibria 
would carry over to a more general setting of spillover effects. By allowing for various realistic 
spillover types between the regions, it seems evident that the monotone benefit functions so far 
considered cannot be maintained. The relevance of a non-monotone host benefit function can for 
example be demonstrated by endogenising income levels of residents. We have so far put aside an 
obvious positive effect of new residents for a region in the form of improved local growth 
perspectives arising from a higher supply of labour units. In the analysis, effects on employment 
could simply be treated as a constant positive contribution to benefits in the host region implying 
that the curves representing the host region in figure 1a-d all move upwards. A more realistic 
modelling, however, needs to incorporate an endogenous determination of individual labour supply 
and, hence, income from residents since a range of local tax and tariff levels may impact on 
incentives to supply labour units. One example is prices of public day care that may affect labour 
supply of residents with children. These residents would include in their calculation of after tax 
income not only direct income taxes but also the effects of local subsidies for day care, (recall that 
the policy variable may also represent local user fees). Changes in the local policy variable could 
therefore have relatively large and complex impacts on the above considered benefit levels of the 
regions, and this may, at first, imply other forms of equilibria than those considered above in the 
game between regions. The general nature of the specified net service function makes scope for 
analysing overall labour supply effects of a change in the policy variable.  
 
Assume there is a benefit () Z h to the host region from a resident’s labour supply h with  0 h Z   and 
0. hh Z   Income now also depends on labour supply via the relation I = wh(σ) where w is the 
exogenously given wage rate which we normalise to w = 1 so that I = h(σ). The benefit to the host 
region then becomes: 
 
            () 1 (() ) , (() ,) ()
hd BN I h P b q I h Z h                            (11) 
and 
     () 1 (() ,) .
nd BP b q I h                                                     (12)   21
 





 . Using that        ,,
d II h N I    , differentiation of (9) 
and (10) yields: 
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Substituting dN d and rearranging terms lead to: 
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and 
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dd
    
 
       .                                (16) 
 
For both 
h B and 
n B  the derivative is now the sum of the derivative when no change in labour 
supply occurs (that is, the derivatives (7) and (8)) and a term being negative (positive) for 
0 dh d   ( 0 dh d  ). The sign of dh d may thus make the specific forms of equilibria 
considered above more or less likely. First, if  0 dh d  for any value of σ in the interval , o    , 
()
n B  is still a decreasing function and it is now more likely that  ( )
h B  is falling, which makes the 
UTUB equilibria the result of the tax game. Conventional wisdom on tax distortions normally says 
that labour supply will fall when taxes rise, meaning that  0 dh d  appears to be the most likely 
case in practice. We shall consider a more general structure arising when benefits of the   22
neighbouring region is falling in . From (16), it appears that this will be the case for 
/( 1 ) 1 I dh d N  
10 meaning that the following proposition applies even for increases in σ that 
leads to (minor) increases in labour supply. This case hence includes a situation like the one 
captured in Figure 4a characterized by ‘several’ crosses between 
h B and 
n B  as well as shifting 
intervals of σ in which 
h B  may fall and rise. Even for this case important insights can be 
established:  
 
Proposition 3. Assume  
n B   to be continuous and falling and assume   
h B   to be non-linear 
and continuous over the interval  0,   . Then there always exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium 
in the tax game. 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 4. Under the same assumptions about   
n B  and   
h B   as in Proposition 3 and 
given that possible local maxima functional values are different for  
h B  , we have that: (i) Except 
for the particular case outlined in (ii), in case an equilibrium is of type ETEB in the tax game, this 
will be unique. In case an equilibrium is of type UTUB, an infinite number of weak Nash equilibria 
may exist of this type, each, however, with the same tax level in the host region.  
(ii) If both an ETEB, 
** (,)
hn   , and an UTUB equilibrium, 
** ** (,)
hn , exist for the tax game, then 
** ** * () ( ) ( ) .
hh n BB B     Further,   
* h B  is a local maximum for the host region benefit 
function and a maximum for this function must occur at a value of  higher than 
**   (see figure 
4b). 
 




                                                 
10 In relation to (16) we can provide an economic interpretation of this condition. Note first that dh/dσ can also be seen 
as the change in disposable income from an income change as   /
d dh d I I    . Then the condition for falling 
neighbour net benefits in σ under endogenous labour supply will be that the direct effect of a demand reduction for the 
local good following from a higher σ exceeds a possible countervailing effect on a demand rise stemming from the 
income increase that appears when individuals decide to raise their labour supply due to a higher σ.    23
Figure 4a. A case with non-monotonic host benefits                                           Figure 4b. The specific case leading to more equilibria 
 
 
The propositions reveal that under quite general benefit structures, equilibrium outcomes of the tax 
game will be the same as the ones already identified in the analysis. In particular, benefit structures 
for the regions that may both lead to an ETEB equilibrium and an UTUB equilibrium (or other 
forms hitherto not identified) do not exist except for the most specific case under (ii), which is 
illustrated in figure 4b. The finding that either equilibria like the ones depicted in figure 1a-d or 
figure 3 will emerge is in other words intact. The specific functional forms behind the majority of 
the analysis therefore does not appear to invalidate the identification of equilibria, and the basic 
findings and the predictionary power of the analysis in explaining the behaviour of local 
policymakers in a competitive environment seem rather strong. This may prove to be useful 
knowledge also for future empirical investigation of issues of strategic interactions.  
 
5.  Conclusion and scope for further work 
 
The primary aim of this paper is to add to the theoretical understanding of strategic competition of 
local governments when spillover effects across regions are present. Our motivation is not least to 
provide some important insights that may contribute to uncover the source of interaction behind the 
spatial correlations between taxes and other decision variables at local levels that several empirical 
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One important message from the analysis is that tax competition between regions for new residents 
need not lead to an equalisation of policy variables across these regions. With spillover effects an 
equilibrium may emerge in which one region chooses a strategy of deterring localisation for some 
types of residents and therefore imposes a level of the policy variable that deviates sufficiently from 
the level set in surrounding regions to keep away these residents. While such strategies are well 
known in environmental policy to deter or attract dirty industries, it is important to reflect on the 
influence of the same strategies on local government behaviour in understanding localisation 
decisions of, for instance, certain demographic groups. In consequence, to find evidence of strategic 
interaction one cannot solely consider the slope of reaction functions among jurisdictions.  
As for spillover effects from new residents, another important equilibrium outcome identified above 
is the ‘not in my backyard’ case in which both regions try to evade the host role for (expected) 
‘costly’ new residents. To focus on the basic equilibria and the strategies behind them, the issues 
have been cast in a simple framework. The findings above proved, on the other hand, to be robust to 
a range of more realistic assumptions including asymmetry of cost, endogenous labour supply and 
competition for more than one household. We have moreover shown that under more general 
assumptions there always exists a unique Nash equilibrium with an outcome to be categorised as 
either an ETEB or a UTUB type.  
 
Still, it would be useful to extend the setup in various directions. For example, we have only 
considered competition among two regions, and also the basic one-stage game applied could 
purposefully be developed to encompass more than simultaneous moves. This is left for further 
analysis. An issue for empirical investigation is the practical occurrence of the outlined equilibrium 
outcomes with unequal policy variables. This is ignored in our own empirical regressions above, 
where the immediate aim is confined to demonstrating the spatial correlations between policy 
variables of neighbouring local jurisdictions also for the case of Denmark. In all, more solid 
empirical examinations of the various kinds of policy equilibria derived in the theoretical analysis 
are generally useful for determining whether they are more than theoretical constructions.   25
APPENDIX  
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
 
First, assume that for every value of   in the interval  0,     ,  ()
n B   >  ()
h B  . Then an 
equilibrium will exist if the host chooses the value of  , where  ( )
h B   reaches its maximum value 
and where the neighbour sets a value of high enough to prevent the host from setting a higher 
value in order to become a neighbour. This is in other words an UTUB equilibrium. 
 
Second, assume that one or more values of exist where  ( )
n B   ≤ ()
h B  . Then also one or more 
values of  exist for which  ( )
n B   =  ( )
h B  . Consider the lowest of these values in the interval 
0,   , and denote this value by L  . Assume first that  ( )
h
L B    ≥  0 and that no value of  <  L   
exists for which  ( ) ( )
hh
L BB    . Then a Nash equilibrium of type ETEB obviously exists for both 
the host and the neighbour choosing  L  , as in this situation the host cannot lower its policy variable 
(given 
n   =  L  ) and achieve a higher benefit or alternatively can raise its policy variable without 
losing the host role and thereby achieve lower benefit as  ()
n B   is falling. Similarly, the neighbour 
cannot raise or lower its policy variable without having to accept a lower benefit. 
Still assuming  ( )
h
L B    ≥  0, if values of  <  L   exist for which  ( ) ( )
hh
L BB    , an equilibrium 
of type ETEB cannot be generated where both regions choose L   (because the host can raise its 
benefit by choosing a value lower than L   and still keep the host role). But then an equilibrium of 
type UTUB exists in which the host chooses the value of  <  L   providing the highest host benefit 
while the neighbour chooses a value that is sufficiently low to make it irrational for the host to 
choose an even higher value to take over the neighbour’s role, again meaning that the neighbour 
sets 
n   higher than     , where      is defined by      
hn BB    . 
 
Now assume that  ( )
h
L B    <  0. Then there always exist values of  <  L    for which 
() ( )
hh
L BB    again entailing that an equilibrium of type UTUB exists. Again the host chooses 
the value of  yielding the highest value of  () .
h B     26
 






Proof of Proposition 4 
 
To prove Proposition 4 we shall first show that for given benefit functions ( )
h B  and ( )
n B  there 
can be only one value of
h   in the interval  0,      which can be an equilibrium tax rate for the host 
region. Therefore, assume that two equilibria exist with two different levels of the tax in the host 
region. Denote the equilibrium strategy profiles by respectively (
** ,
hn   ) and (
** ** ,
hn   ) and 
assume that 
** * hh    . It is clear that for these values 
* ()
hh B   ≤ 
** () .
hh B   Suppose they are not. 
Then 
** h   cannot be a Nash equilibrium value as the host region, for a given level of 
** n   can 
lower its tax to 
* h   (without losing its host role) and achieve a higher benefit. Moreover, in any 
equilibrium, benefits to the host region must be equal to or lower than benefits to the neighbouring 
region. In case not, the neighbour would always be able to raise its benefit by setting its tax rate 
marginally lower than the present host, and then take over the host role and achieve the host benefit. 
For the two assumed equilibria we thus have
** () ()
nh hh BB    and 
** ** () ()
nh hh BB   .  
 
Assume for a while that
* ()
hh B   <  
** ()
hh B  . This contradicts the assumption that 
* h   is a Nash-
equilibrium value, because for this value the host could raise its tax level to 
** h   and raise its 
benefit to either 
** ()
hh B   (if it keeps the host role), or to a value of ( )
nh B  (if it becomes a 
neighbour). For this value we have that  ( )
nh B   > 
* ()
hh B  because ( )
nh B  belongs to the open 
interval     
** * ,
nh nh BB     (since, given the former host is now a neighbour, the new host 
necessarily holds a value of σ in the interval  
** * ,
hh      , ) and in     
** * ,
nh nh BB      all values 
are higher than 
* ()
hh B  . Therefore, whether the original host keeps it role as host or not, it has an 
incentive to deviate from 
* h  so there cannot be two equilibrium values of 
h   when 
* ()
hh B   <  
** ()




hh B   =  
** ()
hh B  , consider the Nash equilibrium with tax rate
* h  for the host. For this 
value 
h B  must clearly have a local maximum. Otherwise, there will be values of 
h B  higher than 
** ()
hh B   for values of σ lower than 
** h   whereby
** h  , cannot be an equilibrium value. As we 
assume local maximum values to be different,
h B  will not have a local maximum for 
** hh    , but 
will be increasing for this value meaning that 
** h   is only an equilibrium value if also the 
neighbouring region sets 
** ** nh    . The strategy profile (
** ** ,
hn   ) is necessarily an equilibrium 
of the ETEB form implying that
** ()
hh B   =  
** ()
nh B  . As ( )
n B  is falling, it also follows that in the 
equilibrium (
** ,
hn   ) we must have that
* n   is set at a level leaving no incentives for the host in 
this equilibrium to raise its policy variable. This is only fulfilled for 
** * nh    .  We can conclude 
that with 
* ()
hh B   =  
** ()
hh B   two equilibria may exist, the one being of the UTUB type, the other 
being of the ETEB type. This very specific case is illustrated in figure 4b. 
 
Finally, in relation to Proposition 3 (i), if only one value of the host policy variable constitutes an 
equilibrium value, say,
* h   in case 
* ()
hh B  =
* ()
nh B   the equilibrium must be an ETEB, since if 
* ()
hh B   < 0 we cannot have an equilibrium (because the host then will lower its tax rate to raise 
benefits). This ETEB is clearly unique since neither an UTUB or several ETEB equilibria can exist 
for the same equilibrium value. Further, in case 
* ()
hh B  <
* ()
nh B  , an UTUB equilibrium exists, 
and an interval of values for the neighbour may constitute an equilibrium value, given 
*,
hh     
since ( )
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